An inexhaustible source of income? The significance of Belarusian refineries and the outlook for the future. OSW Commentary No. 81, 2012-06-20 by Klysinski, Kamil & Kononczuk, Wojciech
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1	 The	second	largest	
shareholder	
is	Russia’s	Slavneft	
(which	is	controlled	
by	Gazprom	Neft	and	
TNK-BP),	which	holds	
a	42.6%	stake.	The	
remaining	2.4%	
of	the	shares	are	held	
by	private	investors.
2	 Oil	supplies	from	
Azerbaijan	were	linked	
to	a	swap	contract	
as	part	
of	oil	co-operation	
with	Venezuela.	
In	addition	to	that,	
Belarus	also	imported	
oil	directly	from	
Venezuela.
3	 In	2011,	Belarus	
exported	1.55	mil-
lion	tonnes	of	oil	for	
a	price	of	US$1.3	
billion.	All	of	this	was	
supplied	to	Germany	
via	the	Druzhba	pipe-
line.
An inexhaustible source of income? The significance 
of Belarusian refineries and the outlook for the future
Kamil Kłysiński, Wojciech Konończuk
Belarus generated a surplus at US$1.9 billion in foreign trade in goods and services 
in the first four months of 2012 as compared to a deficit of US$2.8 billion for the same 
timeframe a year earlier. Minsk owes this, its highest positive trade balance sin-
ce 1991, mainly to a significant increase in exports of petroleum products manu-
factured by the refineries in Navapolatsk and Mazyr. This is a consequence of the 
favourable contract for supplies of Russian oil until 2015 which Belarus signed in 
December last year. This contract has resulted in a de facto resumption of Rus-
sia subsidising Belarus. The favourable conditions of Russian oil supplies will al-
low the Belarusian refineries to remain the driving force of the country’s economy, 
and the Belarusian government will not allow them to be privatised, which Russia 
has been seeking for years. The two refineries initiated an ambitious modernisation 
programme, which is aimed at increasing their output and improving the quality 
of their production. Owing to this, their share in the market of petroleum products in 
the region, including on the Polish market, may grow within the next few years. 
The Belarusian oil sector
There	are	two	oil	refineries	in	operation	in	Belarus.	They	were	built	in	several	stages	in	the	
1960s	and	1970s	as	a	component	of	Soviet	heavy	industry.	One	of	them,	Naftan,	is	located	
in	the	northern	part	of	the	country,	in	Navapolatsk;	the	other	is	in	the	south,	in	Mazyr.	The	
two	refineries	have	a	similar	capacity,	currently	at	11	million	and	12	million	tonnes	of	oil	
per	year	respectively.	Both	are	state-controlled:	Naftan	to	100%,	and	the	Mazyr	refinery	
to	55%1,	both	belonging	to	the	state-owned	corporation,	Belneftekhim.
Almost	 all	 of	 the	 petroleum	 processed	 at	 the	 two	 refineries	 originates	 from	 Russia	
and	is	supplied	via	the	Druzhba	pipeline	or,	to	a	lesser	extent,	by	rail	(15.1	million	tonnes	
and	3	million	tonnes	last	year,	respectively).	Although	the	Belarusian	government	ensured	
oil	supplies	from	Venezuela	and	Azerbaijan	in	2010	while	in	dispute	with	Moscow2,	the	high	
prices	and	logistic	problems	caused	Minsk	abandon	the	alternative	supply	sources	(approxi-
mately	2	million	tonnes	last	year).	Furthermore,	the	state-controlled	company,	Belarusneft,	
produces	small	amounts	of	oil	in	Belarus.	Over	the	past	few	years,	its	annual	production	has	
ranged	between	1.5	and	1.7	million	tonnes,	and	almost	all	of	it	has	been	exported3.	
The significance of the refineries for the Belarusian economy 
The	refineries	in	Mazyr	and	Navapolatsk	are	among	the	companies	of	crucial	significance	for	
the	running	of	the	Belarusian	economy.	According	to	data	from	the	state-controlled	operator	
in	the	oil	sector,	the	Belarusian	Oil	Company,	production	and	trade	in	this	sector	generate	
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up	to	30%	of	the	revenues	of	the	Belarusian	state	budget.	The	two	refineries	are	also	among	
the	country’s	key	exporters.	In	2011,	the	value	of	petroleum	products	sold	to	foreign	markets	
reached	US$12.5	billion,	which	accounted	for	34.3%	of	total	Belarusian	exports.	The	share	
of	petroleum	products	in	exports	in	preceding	years	was	at	a	similar	level	(see	Appendix).	
For	this	reason,	the	refineries	–	in	addition	to	the	potassium	company,	Belkali	–	are	the	main	
source	of	hard	currency	for	the	Belarusian	economy	and	budget.	
The	significance	of	the	Belarusian	refineries	is	increased	further	due	to	the	government’s	ap-
plication	of	‘cross-subsidising’,	i.e.	supporting	low-performance	or	unprofitable	sectors	(such	
as	the	agricultural	sector	or	light	industry)	using	the	profits	generated	by	the	key	contributors	
to	the	state	budget.	One	of	the	forms	this	
aid	 takes	 is	 a	 compulsory	 contributions	
(which	 also	 apply	 to	 the	 petrochemical	
sector)	 to	 the	 ‘national	 innovation	 funds’,	
linked	either	to	particular	ministries	or	ope-
rating	separately.	Furthermore,	one	impor-
tant	and	widely	used	solution	(brought	in	
a	modified	form	from	Soviet	times)	is	the	
imposition	of	the	obligation	on	companies	
to	 ensure	 sophisticated	welfare	program-
mes	for	their	employees	and	their	families;	
this	is	expected	to	maintain	social	stability	in	Belarus.	Thus	the	condition	of	the	refineries	
in	Mazyr	and	Navapolatsk	not	only	has	a	direct	impact	on	state	finances	but	–	due	to	their	
significant	participation	 in	 the	complex	 system	of	 subsidies,	 tax	allowances	and	benefits	
–	 it	 is	 also	 among	 the	 key	 factors	 able	 to	 maintain	 the	 stability	 of	 the	 Belarusian	
command-and-distribution	model.	
The modernisation challenge
In	 2010,	 Belarusian	 refineries	 embarked	 upon	 a	 modernisation	 programme,	 scheduled	
to	be	completed	by	2015,	aimed	at	improving	the	efficiency	of	petroleum	processing	from	
the	present	average	rate	of	72%	to	92%.	The	Nelson	Index4,	which	at	present	is	4.6	in	the	
case	of	the	Mazyr	refinery,	and	7.7	in	the	case	of	Navapolatsk’s	Naftan,	is	to	rise	to	11.85.	
Following	the	modernisation,	the	two	refineries	will	 increase	their	production	of	petrol	by	
45%	and	of	diesel	oil	by	50%	(for	more	details	see	Appendix	2).	Additionally,	the	output	
of	 the	Mazyr	 refinery	will	 increase	 to	12	
million	 tonnes	 annually.	 In	 effect,	 the	
greater	part	of	the	production	of	these	two	
plants	will	meet	the	Euro-5	standard,	and	
their	management	expects	 that	 their	 rate	
of	return	will	 rise	by	approximately	10%,	
which	will	reduce	Belarusian	petrochemi-
cal	sector’s	dependence	on	the	preferential	
prices	of	Russian	oil.	Given	 the	 fact	 that	
the	financial	situation	of	the	Belarusian	re-
fineries	is	directly	dependent	on	the	condi-
tions	of	supply	and	processing	of	crude	oil	
from	Russia,	the	implementation	of	this	task	is	of	paramount	significance	for	Belarus.	
However,	the	most	serious	problem	is	the	cost	of	the	modernisation	of	the	Belarusian	refin-
eries	which,	according	to	estimates,	will	range	between	US$2	and	2.5	billion.	In	turn,	the	
creditworthiness	of	Belarus	is	adversely	affected	to	a	great	extent	by	the	high	level	of	the	
4	 This	is	a	rate	which	reflects	
the	technological	complex-
ity	of	a	given	refinery	and	its	
ability	to	manufacture	highly	
processed	petroleum	products.
5	 For	comparison,	the	Nelson	
Index	for	the	refinery	in	Plock	
is	9.5,	and	for	the	refinery	
in	Mazeikiai	is	10.3.	Data	
quoted	from:	www.orlen.pl/EN/
InvestorRelations/Documents/
Company_overview_EN_
March_2011.pdf 
The refineries in Mazyr and Nava-
polatsk are the main source of hard 
currency for the Belarusian economy 
and budget. They also play a key role 
in maintaining the stability of the 
Belarusian command-and-distribution 
economic model. 
Given the fact that the financial situ-
ation of the Belarusian refineries 
is directly dependent on the conditions 
of supply and processing of crude oil 
from Russia, the plan for improving 
the refineries’ performance, which is to 
be implemented within the timeframe 
between 2010 and 2015, is of para-
mount significance for Belarus. 
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country’s	foreign	debt,	which	has	already	exceeded	60%	of	its	GDP,	and	its	bad	relations	
with	the	West.	Western	banks	and	international	financial	institutions	are	unwilling	to	take	
the	risk	of	financing	any	companies	in	a	country	on	which	economic	sanctions	have	been	
imposed,	also	including	on	the	oil	sector6.	At	the	same	time,	the	possibilities	of	allocating	
such	amounts	of	money	from	the	country’s	own	funds	are	rather	limited.	Although	the	cen-
tral	bank’s	foreign	currency	reserves	this	year	reached	a	record-high	level	of	approximately	
US$8	billion,	they	will	be	used	primarily	to	repay	Belarus’s	foreign	debt,	and	the	instalments	
due	in	2013–2014	will	reach	approximately	US$6	billion	(only	public	debt).	It	appears	that	
the	best-available	variant	of	foreign	credit	for	Minsk	at	present	could	be	to	obtain	support	
from	Russian	oil	companies.	However,	it	is	very	unlikely	that	these	companies	will	be	will-
ing	 to	provide	 funds	 for	 the	modernisation	of	Belarusian	 refineries	without	being	allowed	
to	purchase	control	stakes	in	them	at	the	same	time.
The orientation towards exports
A	distinctive	feature	of	Belarusian	refineries	is	the	fact	that	they	are	export-oriented.	In	2011,	
Mazyr	and	Naftan	exported	a	 total	 of	15.6	million	 tonnes	of	petroleum	products,	worth	
US$12.5	billion.	The	key	purchasers	of	their	production	are	EU	member	states,	which	last	
year	accounted	for	83.5%	of	total	sales.	The	main	recipient	in	the	EU	is	Holland	(44%	of	total	
exports	of	petroleum	products),	which	is	mainly	owing	to	its	role	as	an	agent	in	the	further	
sale	of	these	products	on	the	Amsterdam	exchange.	Another	major	recipient	is	Latvia,	with	
a	share	of	13%.	Other	purchasers	include	Estonia	(3.2%),	Italy	(3%),	the	United	Kingdom	
(3%),	Poland	(2.2%)	and	Lithuania	(2%).	Such	a	significant	share	of	petroleum	products	
in	Belarusian	exports	last	year	allowed	Belarus	to	reach	a	positive	balance	at	US$7	billion	
in	trade	with	the	EU.	From	among	the	non-EU	member	states,	the	most	important	market	
is	Ukraine	(22.5%),	which	is	a	consequence	of	a	long-standing	crisis	in	the	Ukrainian	refin-
ery	sector7.
The	entity	in	charge	of	exporting	the	production	of	the	Mazyr	and	Naftan	refineries	is	the	
Belarusian	Oil	Company,	which	was	established	 in	2007	and	which	 last	 year	 sold	12.7	
million	 tonnes	 of	 petroleum	products	 (an	81.5%	share	 in	 total	 sales	 of	 petroleum	prod-
ucts).	The	remaining	deals	are	effected	by	private	Belarusian	firms	owned	by	entrepreneurs	
linked	 to	 aides	 of	 President	 Alyaksandr	
Lukashenka8.
The	planned	modernisation	of	the	Belaru-
sian	refineries	may	lead	to	an	increase	in	
the	value	of	exports	of	petroleum	products	
to	the	EU	market	owing	to	a	significant	im-
provement	in	their	quality,	i.e.	mainly	the	
production	of	petrol	and	diesel	oil	 at	 the	
expense	 of	 low-processed	 heavy	 fuel	 oil	
(mazut).	The	consequences	of	this	may	include	a	weakening	of	the	position	of	the	Mažeikiai	
refinery	in	the	region	and	an	increase	in	the	share	of	Belarusian	petroleum	products,	mainly	
diesel	oil,	on	the	Polish	market.	The	planned	project	of	building	a	product	pipeline	from	Be-
larus	to	Poland,	which	is	set	to	be	implemented	by	a	private	company,	Energopol	Warszawa,	
could	 also	 contribute	 to	 this.	 According	 to	 initial	 plans,	 this	 project	was	 to	 be	 launched	
already	in	2012;	however	it	still	does	not	have	all	the	permits	required	in	Poland.	If	the	prod-
uct	pipeline	was	built,	this	would	cause	an	increase	in	the	present	3%	share9	of	Belarusian	
production	in	the	Polish	diesel	oil	market	(0.5	million	m3),	and	thus	the	position	of	Orlen	and	
Lotos	in	eastern	Poland	would	be	challenged10.
6	 In	2007,	the	USA	in	response	
to	the	violations	of	human	
rights	in	Belarus	imposed	
sanctions	
on	Belneftekhim,	including	
a	ban	on	exports	and	contacts	
with	US	companies.	In	turn,	
the	EU	sanctions,	in	force	
since	March	2012,	are	
of	a	limited	nature	due	to	
opposition	from	some	of	the	
member	states,	and	apply	only	
to	selected	private	entities	
owned	by	three	businessmen,	
who	provide	
the	financial	base	for	
the	regime.	Two	of	these	
businessmen	are	active	
in	the	oil	sector.
7	 Since	no	import	duty	is	im-
posed	on	petroleum	products	
in	Ukraine,	it	is	more	profit-
able	to	import	these	products	
from	Belarus,	Russia	or	
Lithuania	than	to	manufacture	
them	at	Ukrainian	refineries.	
This	has	led	to	the	winding	
up	of	most	Ukrainian	refiner-
ies.
8	 Such	exporters	include	
the	entities	controlled	
by	the	corporation	Triple	
owned	by	Yuri	Chizh	and	the	
corporation	Univest	owned	
by	Anatol	Tarnausky.	The	EU	
sanctions	have	been	imposed	
on	both	of	them.
9	 Oil	industry	and	trade	
in	2011,	www.popihn.pl/
download.php?s=1&id=749
10	At	present,	Belarusian	petro-
leum	products	are	carried	
to	Poland	by	rail.	The	product	
pipeline	would	essentially	cut	
their	transport	costs.
If the product pipeline was built, this 
would cause an increase in the share 
of Belarusian diesel oil on the Polish 
market, and thus the position of Orlen 
and Lotos in eastern Poland 
would be challenged.
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The external environment for the operation of the refineries 
Since	 the	 beginning	 of	 their	 existence	 the	Belarusian	 refineries	 have	 been	 processing	Rus-
sian	oil	 almost	 exclusively.	 For	 this	 reason,	 conditions	 of	 oil	 supply	have	a	decisive	 impact	
on	the	financial	situation	of	the	two	Belarusian	refineries	and	–	given	their	significance	–	also	
on	the	economy	of	Belarus.	In	December	2011,	Belarus	and	Moscow	signed	a	new	contract	
on	supplies	of	Russian	oil	in	2012–2015.	Pursuant	to	this	contract,	oil	will	be	supplied	to	the	
Belarusian	 refineries	without	 export	duty	being	 imposed	and	sold	at	a	discount	of	US$3.7	
per	tonne	in	comparison	to	the	oil	price	at	the	Rotterdam	exchange.	The	relinquishing	of	the	
bonuses	charged	by	Russian	suppliers	on	each	tonne	of	oil	was	an	important	concession	from	
Moscow	–	the	value	of	such	bonuses	could	reach	even	US$45,	which	significantly	affected	the	
profitability	of	processing	last	year.	In	turn,	oil	companies	from	Russia	were	allowed	to	receive	
for	their	own	needs	products	manufactured	from	up	to	50%	of	oil	supplied	by	them	to	Mazyr	
and	Navapolatsk	(‘tolling’).	At	the	same	time,	the	agreements	state	that	if	Belarus	exports	petro-
leum	products	made	from	Russian	oil	to	countries	which	do	not	belong	to	the	Customs	Union,	
Minsk	will	have	to	pay	export	duty	to	Moscow	at	the	same	rate	as	paid	by	Russian	exporters.
While	operating	according	to	the	old	rules	in	2011,	the	Belarusian	refineries	were	unprofit-
able	and	managed	to	improve	their	situation	only	in	the	last	quarter	of	last	year,	which	al-
lowed	them	to	close	the	year	with	a	small	profit	(approximately	US$16	million).	This	was	the	
worst	result	achieved	by	the	Belarusian	petrochemical	sector	in	the	past	few	years.	
The	new	 rules	 of	Russian	 oil	 supply	 are	much	more	beneficial	 than	 those	 in	 force	 after	
2007,	when	Russia	changed	the	oil	supply	model	which	had	been	applied	for	many	years.	
This	significantly	reduced	the	level	of	its	subsidies	for	the	Belarusian	economy11.	The	new	
four-year	contract	concerning	Russian	oil	imports	means	that	there	has	been	a	partial	re-
sumption	of	Russian	subsidies.	The	average	price	per	barrel	paid	by	Belarusian	refineries	in	
the	first	quarter	this	year	reached	US$61	while	at	the	same	time	the	Russian	oil	Urals	cost	
on	average	US$115	per	barrel	on	the	EU	market.	The	government	in	Minsk	estimates	that,	
owing	to	the	preferential	conditions,	Belarus	has	gained	between	US$0.7	billion	and	US$1	
billion	annually.	It	is	still	unclear	how	the	need	to	guarantee	that	50%	of	oil	supplied	will	be	
processed	for	the	Russian	suppliers’	own	needs	will	affect	the	situation	of	the	refineries	in	
Mazyr	and	Navapolatsk	in	the	longer	term.	In	the	first	quarter	of	this	year,	30%	of	oil	sup-
plied	was	processed	according	to	the	tolling	rule	for	the	needs	of	oil	companies	from	Russia.	
At	the	same	time,	everything	seems	to	indicate	that	the	Belarusian	government	has	been	
abusing	the	oil	preferences	obtained	from	Russia.	In	2011,	Belarusian	exports	of	solvents	
and	 thinners	 increased	 several	 times,	 and	 their	 value	 reached	US$1.5	 billion	 (the	main	
recipient	 was	 Latvia).	 This	 could	 not	 be	
explained	 by	 a	 sudden	 increase	 in	 the	
demand	 for	 these	 chemical	 products,	
and	 therefore	 it	 was	 probably	 an	 effect	
of	Minsk’s	forgery	of	customs	documenta-
tion,	and	the	‘solvents	and	thinners’	were	
in	 fact	petroleum	products	on	which	Be-
larus	does	not	need	to	pay	export	duty	to	
the	 Russian	 budget12.	 This	 practice	 has	
continued	this	year	–	according	to	official	
data	for	the	first	quarter,	exports	of	these	
substances	 increased	 twelve-fold.	 The	
Russian	government	turned	a	blind	eye	to	
this	problem	for	a	long	time,	which	may	prove	that	the	Russian	oil	sector	also	benefited	from	
this	scheme.	It	was	only	in	the	past	few	weeks	that	the	Prime	Minister	Dmitry	Medvedev	
ordered	that	actions	aimed	at	clearing	up	this	issue	be	taken.	
11	Before	2007,	Russia	not	only	
sold	oil	to	Belarus	with	no	cus-
toms	duty	imposed,	but	also	
all	the	export	duty	imposed	on	
Belarusian	petroleum	products	
went	to	the	Belarusian	budget.	
The	rules	of	Russian	oil	sup-
plies	changed	several	times	
in	2007–2011,	depending	
on	the	state	of	political	rela-
tions	between	Minsk	
and	Moscow.	
12	See:	Y.	Romanchuk,	Krizis.	
Belarus	kak	territoriya	
neftebaronov,	29	February	
2012,	http://naviny.by/rubrics/
opinion/2012/02/29/ic_arti-
cles_410_177018/
Owing to the preferential conditions, 
Belarus has gained between US$0.7 
billion and US$1 billion annually. 
At the same time, everything seems 
to indicate that the Belarusian govern-
ment has been abusing the oil preferen-
ces obtained from Russia and has been 
forging export documentation to evade 
the payment of export duty to Russia.
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Possible future developments – is there an alternative to Russian investments?
Maintaining	control	of	the	Belarusian	oil	sector	will	have	a	strategic	significance	for	the	Belarusian	government.	It	may	
thus	be	expected	that	the	privatisation	of	the	two	refineries	–	Russian	companies	have	been	seeking	for	this	for	years	
–	will	still	be	held	back.	This	will	give	rise	to	tension	in	relations	with	Russia,	the	only	realistic	investor	and	the	sole	
oil	supplier.	The	scale	of	such	bilateral	disputes	and	their	frequency	will	depend	on	the	political	situation	in	Russia	
and	its	priorities	in	foreign	policy.	At	present,	the	integration	of	part	of	the	post-Soviet	area	is	among	the	main	goals	
of	President	Putin.	Therefore,	at	least	in	the	next	few	months,	tension	is	unlikely	to	be	escalated	in	the	main	disputes	
in	relations	between	Russia	and	Belarus,	including	regarding	the	privatisation	of	the	refineries.	This	also	means	that	
the	preferential	conditions	of	Russian	oil	supplies	will	be	maintained	(at	least	in	the	short	term)	and	that	Moscow	will	
continue	to	tolerate	what	is	most	likely	the	large	scale	forgery	of	Belarusian	customs	documentation.	At	the	same	time,	
despite	its	criticism	of	the	Belarusian	regime	for	the	violation	of	human	rights	and	the	rules	of	democracy,	the	EU	will	
not	be	able	to	decide	to	impose	a	complete	ban	on	imports	of	petroleum	products	from	Belarus.	Given	this	situation,	
it	may	be	expected	that	the	present	good	situation	in	exports	of	Belarusian	petroleum	products	to	the	EU	market	will	
continue	for	a	long	time.	As	a	result,	the	Belarusian	government	will	in	all	likelihood	be	able	to	generate	the	funds	
necessary	to	complete	the	modernisation	of	the	Belarusian	refineries.	Owing	to	this,	the	Belarusian	oil	sector	will	have	
the	opportunity	to	reduce	its	reliance	on	Russian	preferences,	and	its	production	will	become	more	competitive	on	
Western	markets.	
1. The share of petroleum products in total Belarusian exports (2005–2011)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total exports (US$ billion) 15.9 19.7 24.3 32.5 21.3 25.2 40.2
Exports of petroleum products and oil 
(US$ billion)
4.8 6.7 8.1 11.9 7.8 6.7 13.8
% 24.6 34 33 36.6 36.6 26.1 34.3
Data: Belstat
2. The output of the refineries in Mazyr and Navapolatsk before and after modernisation (millions of tonnes) 
Mazyr Navapolatsk
2011 2015 2011 2015
Petrol 2.16 3.0 0.96 1.7
Diesel oil 2.75 4.7 3.9 5.2
Heating oil 2.93 0.7 2.16 0.6
VGO (vacuum gas oil) 0.21 1.1 0.52 1.12
Data: Argus FSU Energy, 19 April 2012
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